The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness by Ghazala Azmat & Nagore Iriberri
The Provision of Relative Performance Feedback Information: 






+     Nagore  Iriberri
∗∗ 
 





This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback information on 
individual performance and on individual affective response, when agents are rewarded 
according to their absolute performance. In a laboratory set-up, agents perform a real 
effort task and when receiving feedback, they are asked to rate their happiness, arousal 
and feeling of dominance. Control subjects learn only their absolute performance, while 
the treated subjects additionally learn the average performance in the session. 
Performance is 17 percent higher when relative performance feedback is provided. 
Furthermore, although feedback increases the performance independent of the content 
(i.e., performing above or below the average), the content is determinant for the 
affective response. When subjects are treated, the inequality in the happiness and the 
feeling of dominance between those subjects performing above and below the average 
increases by 8 and 6 percentage points, respectively.  
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1. Introduction 
Performance appraisals have become standard practice in organizations. As of 
the early 1980's, between seventy-four and eighty-nine percent of American businesses 
used them, see Murphy and Cleveland (1991). Informing agents about how well they 
are performing relative to their peers, in other words, by providing workers with relative 
performance feedback information, is a common way in which performance appraisals 
are implemented. Given its widespread use, it is important to understand the 
consequences of providing relative performance feedback information.  
Managerial economics and social psychology has devoted quite a lot of attention 
to the study of performance appraisals, both to the theory and practice (see Bretz et al., 
1992, and Levy et al., 2004, for reviews). Research on Economics, however, has paid 
little attention to relative performance feedback information. Two issues have, 
nevertheless, caught economists’ attention. First, from a theoretical point of view the 
optimal provision of relative performance feedback information has been studied.
1 
Second, empirical research has also focused on the effect of its provision on individual 
performance, which depends on the underlying incentives. In particular, under piece-
rate incentives, when agents are rewarded according to their absolute performance, 
Hannan et al. (2008) in an experimental set-up without real effort, Azmat and Iriberri 
(2010) in an educational set-up, and Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2009) in a firm setting, 
find that the provision of relative performance feedback information has a positive 
effect on performance. Eriksson et al. (2009), in an experimental set-up with real effort, 
find that although performance is not affected it does increase the mistake rate of the 
worst performing agent.
 2 
3 A number of different reasons for why individuals would 
react to relative performance feedback information under piece-rate incentives have 
                                                 
1 This work has mostly been conducted in the tournament literature, such as in Gershkov and Perry 
(2009), Kräkel (2007), Lai and Matros (2007) and Ederer (2010). Hansen (2009) studies the provision of 
performance appraisals when agents have career concerns, providing a rationale for the common finding 
that the provided feedback is less informative than it could be (mostly top-medium ratings and little 
negative feedback). Crutzen et al. (2010) studies the consequence of pay differentiation on employees’ 
self-perception. 
2 Under flat-rate incentives, being observed and observing others’ work brings positive effects on 
performance (Falk and Ichino, 2006, Mas and Moretti, 2009, and Kuhnen and Tymula, 2008). In 
tournaments, Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009), Young et al. (1993), Muller and Schotter (2003), 
Hannan et al. (2008), Fehr and Ederer (2007) and Eriksson et al. (2009) study the effect of relative 
performance feedback information. The evidence is mixed, while some authors find that the provision of 
relative performance feedback increases all participants’ effort, others find that the leading participants 
slack off and participants who are lagging behind give up. Ockenfels et al. (2010) study how bonus 
payments based on performance ratings, affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, 
multinational company.  
3 Recently, Bandiera et al. (2009) and Delfgaauw et al. (2009) have also considered the impact of relative 
performance feedback at the team level.    3
been proposed. In particular, when relative performance feedback information is 
provided, the sense of competition among agents increases, which means they put in 
higher effort. 
The papers mentioned above focus their studies on how agents’ performance is 
affected when relative performance feedback information is provided. They do not pay 
any attention to how agents themselves feel when given relative performance feedback, 
despite its importance for practitioners and organizations. Bowles (1998) argues that 
“economic institutions structure the tasks people face and hence influence not only their 
capacities but their values and psychological functioning as well”. One important 
measure of how agents feel is their level of happiness or subjective well-being. In recent 
years, economists and managers have started to give more weight to individuals’ 
happiness as an important outcome variable of interest, along with more traditional 
outcome variables. Recent overviews of research on happiness and its relation to 
economics are provided by Kahneman et al. (1999), Loewenstein (2000), Frey and 
Stutzer (2002), Krueger (2005) and McFadden (2005). In particular, labor market 
studies on workers’ psyche, which include broader measures than happiness, have 
shown to be very important in determining their moral and motivation, while at the 
same time having crucial effects on relevant issues such as firms’ retention ability (see 
Bewley, 1999).  
This paper studies the provision of relative performance feedback information 
under piece-rate incentives on two important measures: on agents’ performance and on 
agents’ affective response. Affective response includes measures of agents’ emotional 
state, such as happiness (subjective well-being or experienced utility), arousal (or 
motivation) and feeling of dominance. Furthermore, given that in practice the relative 
performance feedback information is rarely provided just once, we investigate the 
dynamic effects of its provision on both, performance and affective response. Finally, by 
replicating our analysis under a flat-rate analysis scheme, we also investigate whether 
the relevance of the information, in terms of income, plays a role. By exploring all these 
dimensions, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of the provision of 
relative performance feedback information, which, so far, have not been addressed. 
We propose a controlled laboratory set-up, where subjects perform a real effort 
task and are rewarded according to piece-rate incentives. There are four working 
periods. In between periods, the control subjects are provided with their absolute 
performance, while the treated subjects are provided with their absolute performance   4
and with the average performance in the session. Once feedback is provided, both 
control and treated subjects’ affective response is elicited, that is, they are asked to rate 
their happiness, arousal and dominance levels. See Figure 1 for a graphical description 
of the experiment.  
Our set-up offers a number of advantages over the previous studies for analyzing 
the effect of relative performance feedback information on performance under piece-
rate incentives. In particular, when compared to field studies, the controlled lab 
environment allows us to attribute the observed treatment effect solely to the treated 
individuals’ reaction and not to any other entity. For example, students who receive 
relative performance feedback information might be reacting through their parents’ 
response, rather than their own (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). Moreover, compared to the 
other two experimental papers, we use a real effort setting, unlike in Hannan et al. 
(2008), and the information provided refers to a group, unlike in Eriksson et al. (2009), 
who provide it as pair-wise comparison. In many labor settings, the comparison to a 
group of co-workers might be more informative than the comparison to one another co-
worker. In addition to the set-up advantages, we are able to relate the performance 
findings to a number of new and interesting dimensions, such as gender, which have 
previously been unexplored.   
With respect to performance, consistent with the mainstream of previous 
findings, we find that the provision of relative performance feedback information had a 
strong and positive effect on individual performance. Those subjects who received 
relative performance feedback information increased their performance by 17 percent 
compared to those who did not. With regard to the dynamic effects of providing relative 
performance feedback information, we find that in each period, the treated subjects 
outperform the untreated, although the effect becomes weaker over time. In addition, 
the content of the feedback information (i.e., positive (negative) feedback when agents 
are informed that they are performing above (below) the average) does not affect 
subjects’ subsequent performance differently, since all subjects increased their 
performance. Finally, we find a strong gender difference in the reaction to the treatment, 
such that solely boys drive the overall treatment effect. This is a new and interesting 
result that adds to the recent literature on gender differences in relevant economic 
environments. 
With respect to the affective response, we find that the provision of relative 
performance feedback information had strong effects both on happiness and dominance   5
levels. Contrary to the findings on performance, we show that the treatment had very 
different effects on those who are receiving positive versus negative feedback. We find 
that receiving positive (negative) feedback affects subjects’ happiness and dominance 
levels positively (negatively), such that when we only consider the overall treatment 
effect, the opposite signs cancel out. With respect to the happiness, the relative feedback 
leads to an increase in the gap (or inequality) of subjects’ happiness, between those 
performing above and below the group average, by 8 percentage points. With respect to 
the dominance levels, the treatment leads to an increase in the inequality of subjects’ 
feeling of dominance between those performing above and below the group average, by 
6 percentage points. Moreover, the inequality in both happiness and dominance 
increases over time with the cumulative information. Finally, unlike the effect on 
performance, we find no gender differences in the affective response to the feedback 
treatment.  
The finding related to the inequality in happiness is consistent with the finding 
on relative income and happiness, which has been studied in Economics since 
Duesenberry (1949) and Easterlin (1974) (see Clark et al., 2008, for a comprehensive 
and recent review). Those subjects who are made aware of the differences in income 
show a higher inequality in happiness than those subjects who are unaware of it. For 
further insight, we explore whether the effect we observe, both on performance and on 
affective response, are due to relative performance or relative income information. We 
investigate this by replicating our experiment under flat-rate incentives. Regarding 
individual performance, we find evidence that individuals mostly react when relative 
performance information has consequences in terms of income (i.e. under piece-rate but 
not under flat-rate incentives). Interestingly, we still find large gender difference in 
performance; while boys continue to react positively to the relative performance 
feedback, where the magnitudes are much smaller than under piece-rate, girls react 
negatively to it. In addition, we see no effect of relative performance feedback 
information on affective response under flat-rate incentives. These findings are 
important in two ways. First, relative performance feedback affects individuals’ 
emotional state (increasing inequality in happiness and in the feeling of dominance) 
only when this information has consequences in terms of income (under piece-rate). 
Second, it also rules out a concern for potential experimental “demand” effects in the 
elicitation of subjects’ affective response (i.e., subjects react to the information because 
they feel they are expected to by the experimentalist). Given the inequality in happiness   6
and feeling of dominance is only found under piece-rate incentives and not under flat-
rate incentives, this effect is less likely to be driven by purely experimental demand 
effects.  
To our knowledge this is the first paper that looks at the effect of relative 
performance feedback information on agents’ affective response in a controlled 
environment. There are two related experimental papers. First, Charness and Grosskopf 
(2001) test in a dictator type setting whether there is a relationship between a person’s 
happiness and the weight she attaches to relative payoffs. They do not find support for 
the hypothesis that happiness levels are inversely related to a preoccupation with 
relative payoffs.
4 Note that our experimental design is rather different in terms of the 
underlying incentives. Unlike in their setting, the subjects in our environment can 
substantially improve their material payoff by putting in higher effort, while their effect 
on others’ material payoffs is negligible. Second, Brandts et al. (2009) study the effect 
of a competitive environment on happiness and find that competition leads to an 
increase in inequality in happiness between those subjects who are chosen to participate 
and those who are excluded during the competition. This increase in inequality is 
consistent with our findings. Note, however, that in our setting the competition is rather 
symbolic, given that there is no actual prize or tournament-like incentives. However, the 
provision of relative performance feedback information might foster competition 
through social comparison (Festinger, 1954). See Azmat and Iriberri (2010) for further 
discussion on the relationship between relative performance feedback information and 
competition. 
The findings from this paper have important implications for understanding 
whether or not an organization would choose to provide relative performance feedback 
information. We have shown that there are very strong effects on performance, when 
performance is rewarded, and this implies strong incentives for an organization to 
employ this mechanism, especially because its implementation has a negligible cost. 
However, we have gone beyond conventional thinking on this issue and we have 
highlighted that this mechanism, while being very effective on increasing performance, 
has important consequences on individuals’ affective state. When agents’ psychological 
aspects affect their morale and motivation, or even firms’ retention ability, then it 
justifies why an organization would care about these aspects (Bewley, 1999). 
                                                 
4 The authors mention that this might be due to the fact that they find little concern for social standing and 
so their test has less power.   7
Organizations, only after understanding all the consequences of providing agents with 
relative performance feedback information can evaluate the appropriateness of such a 
policy.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design 
and procedures in detail. Section 3 contains an overview of the main results, presented 
through graphical analysis. In Section 4 we proceed to do the econometric analysis, 
quantifying the main treatment effects. This section contains two main parts. First, we 
start by analyzing the effect of the treatment on individual performance. Second, we 
analyze the effect of the treatment on the individuals’ affective response. Both 
subsections follow the same order: first we analyze the overall treatment effect, then, we 
test for gender differences and finally we analyze the effect of the positive/negative 
content of the feedback. Section 5 contains the analysis under a flat-rate incentive 
scheme. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.  
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
      Eight  experimental  sessions  were conducted in the Laboratori d’Economia 
Experimental (LEEX) at Universitat Pompeu Fabra using z-Tree experimental software 
(Fischbacher, 2007) between April and May of 2009. A total of 160 subjects, 20 per 
session, were recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004), ensuring 
that subjects had not participated in similar experiments in our laboratory in the past. 
After arrival, a sheet with general and identical instructions was distributed and read 
aloud to all subjects. The instructions can be found in the appendix at the end of the 
paper. Subjects were guaranteed a 3 euro show-up fee. Throughout the experiment we 
ensured effective separation between subjects, since they were seated at cubicles, so that 
they could not observe other subjects’ screen. Once the experiment had concluded, 
subjects filled in a questionnaire while they waited to be paid. The questionnaire can be 
found in the appendix at the end of the paper. Subjects were paid individually and in 
private using a closed envelope. Each experimental session lasted one hour.     
  Figure 1 shows the timeline of the experiment. It consisted of four working 
periods of five minutes each. During each period, subjects were presented with the same 
summations of four randomly generated numbers of two digits each, for which subjects 
were asked to submit an answer.
5 Subjects were rewarded according to their 
                                                 
5 Many experimental papers have used summations, as a real-effort task, since it combines both ability 
and effort. See for example, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Eriksson et al. (2009).   8
performance, that is, the number of correctly solved summations. More specifically, 
subjects were paid 0.15 euros for each correctly submitted answer (piece-rate 
incentives). All four working periods counted equally and the total payment depended 
on the correctly solved summations during the four periods. We also replicated the 
whole experiment under flat-rate incentives (see Section 5). The only change we made 
to the experimental design was that, instead of rewarding subjects for every correct 
summation (piece-rate), we gave all subjects a flat-rate of 15 euros (flat-rate). 
  At the end of each working period, four times during the experiment, subjects 
could rest for two minutes while they were given feedback. After the two minutes with 
the feedback information, they were asked to answer three questions included in the 
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) by Lang (1980). We will proceed to explain the 
feedback information, as well as the SAM questionnaire. 
The treatment variable of interest is the feedback information about 
performance, which was provided at the end of each period. Half of the subjects (80 
subjects), the control group, were provided with information about their correct number 
of summations. We will refer to this as absolute performance. The other half (80 
subjects), the treatment group, were provided not only with information about their 
correct number of summations, but they were also provided with the average correct 
number of summations within the experimental session. Therefore, subjects in the 
treatment group could observe whether they performed better or worse than the average, 
as well as the distance from this average. We will refer to this feedback information as 
the relative performance feedback information. It is important to note that all subjects, 
both in the treatment and control groups, were explained in the instructions the type of 
information they would receive (see instructions in the appendix at the end of the 
paper).  
  The SAM questionnaire, which is very common in social psychology, measures 
the affective response to a task. It consists of three sets of five pictures each, as shown 
in Figure 2. The top set measures happiness in a numerical scale between 1 and 9, where 
1 represents happy and 9 represents unhappy. The second set measures arousal in a 
scale between 1 and 9, where 1 represents aroused and 9 represents unaroused. The 
third set measures dominance in a scale between 1 and 9, where 1 represents dominated 
and 9 represents dominant. In all administrations involving SAM, the subjects were 
instructed to rate their personal affective response using the pictures provided. The 
SAM instructions included the list of words from the pertinent end of each semantic   9
differential scales in order to identify the anchors of each dimension to the subject. 
Thus, the subject was instructed, for example, to use the extreme happy SAM rating if 
the reaction was one of feeling “happy, pleased, satisfied, contented, hopeful, relaxed”, 
and to use the other extreme if she felt “unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, melancholic, 
despairing, or bored”. Similar instructions accompanied all three scales.
6 
  Given that the SAM questionnaire was administered straight after providing 
subjects with feedback, we may be concerned that experimental demand effects might 
drive any effect found on individuals’ affective response. This means that subjects react 
to the feedback treatment because they think that the experimentalist expects them to 
react. That is a pervasive concern without a clean solution in any study that elicits 
subjects’ affective response. We address this in two ways. First, we follow a between-
subject design methodology instead of a within-subject design, which is regarded as the 
safer methodology in order to avoid demand effects. Second, we conduct our 
experiment under both, piece-rate and flat-rate incentives, and find radically different 
results depending on the incentives. These differences, which are discussed at length in 
Section 5, rule-out this concern.  
  After the four working periods and the four periods of feedback and SAM 
questions are over, subjects were informed about their total earned money. The 
treatment group were also informed about the average earnings in the experiment, such 
that, again they could observe whether they would get higher or lower earnings than the 
average subject within the experimental session. The total average earnings in the 
experiment, including the show-up fee, were 14.69 euros, where the average was 14.55 
euros in the control group and 14.84 euros in the treatment group.  
  Finally, while they waited to be paid, they were given a questionnaire that 
requested demographic details. We use these details as control variables in the 
econometric analysis. See the appendix for a specific list of questions they answered.  
 
3. Graphical Analysis 
                                                 
6 The subject was instructed to use the extreme aroused SAM rating if the reaction was one of feeling 
“stimulated, excited, frenzied, jittery, wide awake, aroused” and to use the other extreme if she felt 
“relaxed, calm, sluggish, dull, sleepy, unaroused”. The subject was instructed to use the extreme 
dominated SAM rating if the reaction was one of feeling “controlled, influenced, cared for, awed, 
submissive”, and to use the other extreme if she felt “controlling, influential, in control, important, 
dominant”.  
   10
In this section, we provide an overall picture of the main results from the 
experiment using graphical analysis.  
In Figures 3 to 6, we show subjects’ average behavior for the treatment and 
control groups for the variables of interest. The variables of interest are the number of 
summations subjects submit (Submitted), which should be interpreted as effort, and the 
number of correct answers they give (Correct), which should be interpreted as 
performance. We are also interested in the happiness, arousal and dominance levels 
subjects reveal during the four periods. We do this in two steps. First, we look at 
averages over all subjects (Figures 3 and 4). Second, for a given period, we split the 
subject population between those who perform above the average in a given session, to 
which we will refer to as above subjects, and those who perform below the average, to 
whom we will refer to as below subjects (Figures 5 and 6).  
Figure 3 shows the average submitted and correct number of summations over 
all subjects for each of the four periods. The treatment group submits significantly more 
summations than the control group in all four periods, although the significance declines 
over time (p-values of 0.00, 0.03, 0.04, and 0.07 for the two-sided mean comparison 
tests in periods 1 to 4, respectively). The treatment group also correctly solves 
significantly more summations than the control group in all four periods, although only 
marginally significant in the fourth period comparison (p-values of 0.00, 0.05, 0.06, and 
0.10 for the two-sided mean comparison in periods 1 to 4, respectively). 
The graphical analysis shows that the relative performance feedback information 
is an effective tool to increase performance. In addition, knowing that the relative 
performance feedback information will be provided is an important factor in pushing the 
individual performance, given the difference we observe in the first period. We also 
observe that there is learning over time for both the control and treatment groups. The 
average submitted and the average correctly solved summations increase over time, 
where learning is steeper in the second and third periods (see footnote 8).  
Figure 4 shows the average emotional reaction using three main variables, 
happiness, arousal and dominance, respectively. As it can be seen in the graphs, the 
three variables show no significant difference between the treatment and the control 
groups (p-values for the difference between treatment and control, averaged over all 4 
periods,  is 0.76 for happiness, 0.40 for arousal and 0.71 for dominance). Note that in 
Figure 4 and from now on, we reverse the SAM scale for happiness and arousal to make   11
it more intuitive, such that 1 represents the least happy (unaroused) and 9 the most 
happy (aroused). 
In Figure 5, the number of submitted, as well as correct, is higher in the 
treatment group for both, the above and below subjects, over all periods. The figures 
suggest that the feedback treatment increased performance for all subjects, independent 
of whether they were performing above or below the average. Also, it suggests that the 
treatment was not different for the below and above performing subjects, such that the 
gap between the above and below performing subjects remained the same for the 
control and treated subjects.  
When we look at affective response separately for the above and below subjects, 
interesting patterns emerge. Regarding happiness, as one would expect, we can see from 
Figure 6 that above subjects are always happier than those below. This is the case for 
both the treatment and control groups. However, the inequality or gap in happiness 
between subjects performing above and below increases when subjects are provided 
with relative performance feedback information. This is an important finding because 
we observe that the provision of relative performance feedback information affects, not 
only subjects’ performance, but also their happiness.  
With respect to arousal, again we observe that in both, the control and treatment 
groups, subjects performing below the average show to be less aroused than subjects 
performing above the average. In addition, the relative performance feedback 
information seems to increase the level of arousal of those who are performing above. 
However, from the econometric analysis in the next section, we will see that this is not 
statistically significant. 
Finally, regarding the feeling of dominance, again, as one would expect, in both 
the control and treatment groups, subjects performing above feel, overall, more 
dominant than subjects performing below the average. As in the case for happiness, the 
relative performance feedback information increases the gap in the feeling of 
dominance between those subjects performing above and below, compared to the 
control group.   
To sum up, the treatment group shows higher performance than the control 
group. In addition, subjects performing above the average are overall happier, more 
motivated and more dominant than those subjects performing below the average. 
Furthermore, the provision of the relative performance feedback information increases 
the difference in happiness and in the feeling of dominance between those subjects who   12
are performing above the average and those who are performing below the average, 
compared to the control group. We now proceed to quantify these effects in the 
following section.  
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
  This section consists of two main parts. First, we will focus on the effect of 
relative performance feedback on individual performance. Second, we will study the 
effect on the affective response. For both, performance and affective response, we start 
by measuring the overall effect of the feedback, we then look for gender differences and 
finally, we analyze the effect that the feedback content has on each of the outcomes. 
 
4.1. The Effect of Relative Performance Feedback Information on Performance 
4.1.1. The Overall Effect 
The performance measures of interest are the number of summations subjects 
submit (Submitted) and the number of correct answers they get (Correct). Figure 7 
shows the kernel distributions for these two variables. The distributions clearly show 
that for both, submitted and correct summations, the treated subjects outperform the 
control subjects. This difference is shown in all parts of the distribution, suggesting that 
the treatment had a positive effect on treated subjects, independent of the information 
they were receiving, that is, whether they were learning that they were performing 
above or below the average, which is in-line with those found in Azmat and Iriberri 
(2010).
7 This will be confirmed in section 4.1.2.  
To quantify the average treatment effect, we estimate the following linear 
regression.  
(1)  it i t it Y Treatment Period α βλ ε =+ + + 
where the dependent variable, it Y , refers to the performance measures, Submitted or 
Correct, for individual i at period t. The variable Treatment identifies those who 
received the relative performance feedback information. We also include a time trend, 
Period.  
Column 1 in Tables 1 and 2 show the estimates for equation (1) for submitted 
and correct summations, respectively. Since there are four working periods for each 
subject, we also weight the observations by the individual fixed effects (random effects 
                                                 
7 In Figure 2 of Azmat and Iriberri (2010) we can see similar kernel distributions.    13
model). On average, individuals submit 14.80 summations, of which 12.34 are correct. 
In both instances we see that the treated subjects significantly perform better. The 
treated subjects submit 13.82 percent (treatment coefficient 2.05) more summations and 
correctly answer 17.34 percent (treatment coefficient 2.14) more summations. It is 
interesting to note that the information, not only makes the subjects work harder but 
they also get better results. Time also matters and the estimates suggest that the subjects 
perform better over time. We further investigate the treatment effect separately for each 
period.  
  In columns 2 to 5 of Tables 1 and 2 we estimate by OLS the equation (1) for 
periods 1 to 4 for submitted and correct summations, respectively. Over time, subjects 
improve in their performance, which implies there is learning. Subjects become 
accustomed to the computer application and the task.
8 We can also see that this learning 
is steeper in the beginning and it slows down in the last period. More interestingly, 
treated subjects outperform the control subjects in each period, although the effect is 
strongest in the initial period, suggesting an anticipation effect.
9 We also observed that 
in Figure 3. The anticipation effect is in-line with those found by Blanes i Vidal and 
Nossol (2009) and Kuhnen and Tymula (2008), under piece-rate and flat-rate incentives, 
respectively.  
  An alternative performance variable of interest is the number of mistakes that 
subjects make during the task, i.e., the difference between the number of submitted 
summations and the number of correct summations. This would measure the quality of 
performance. Eriksson et al. (2009) have subjects that are in pairs performing under 
piece-rate incentives and each subject is informed about the performance of the other 
subject in her pair. They find that while the information had no effect per se on 
performance, it did increase the mistake rate of the worst performing subject. In order to 
test for the quality of performance, we estimated equation (1) using this outcome 
variable, but we find that the treatment had no effect on the quality of performance.  
Finally, we repeat the analysis adding control variables. 
(2)  it i t i it X Period Treatment Y ε δ λ β α + + + + =  
                                                 
8 Subjects were not allowed to use paper and pencil for summations. However, we observed that many 
subjects did the summations column by column. In the beginning, they were memorizing rather than 
putting into the computer the summation of the first column. By not having to memorize the summation 
for the first column, improved their performance substantially.   
9 We observed the strong first period effect in all four sessions for the treated subjects.    14
where i X is a vector of control variables, including gender, foreign, age and controls for 
ability. We use different measures of ability. First, we include a dummy for whether 
subjects’ degree of study was science oriented or not (Science_Degree). Second, a 
dummy variable for whether the subject took the math test in the national level 
university entry test Selectividad (Math_Test).
10 From columns 6-10 in Tables 1 and 2 
we can see that the point estimates of the treatment effect overall, as well as period by 
period, are very similar to those without controls, as one would expect in a randomized 
experiment. As for controls, only the Math_Test variable has a small positive and 
significant effect in the number of submitted summations, although not in the number of 
correct summations.
11 Given that the estimates do not change when we include the 
control variables, in the analysis that follows we will estimate equation (1).   
In summary, the provision of relative performance feedback information has a 
positive and significant effect on subjects’ performance. This effect is strongest in the 
initial period. Furthermore, subjects continue to react to this information in all 
subsequent periods although the magnitude of the effect is lower than in the first period. 
The coefficients in periods 2, 3 and 4 are not significantly different from one another.
12  
 
4.1.2. Gender Analysis 
  Many studies have shown gender to be an important variable when looking at 
competitive environments (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Given that the provision of 
relative performance feedback information facilitates social comparison and that this 
might foster competition, we investigate whether girls react differently from boys to the 
relative performance feedback information.  
  We estimate the following equation:  
(3) * it i i i i t it Y Girl Treatment Girl Treatment Period α βχ δ λ ε =+ + + + + 
                                                 
10 Selectividad is similar to the Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) used in the United States taken at the end 
of the fourth year of high school. Selectividad differs from SAT in that it tests the knowledge on the 
topics covered during the last year of high school. If the student wants to do a science oriented degree she 
must take Math test in Selectividad. Otherwise, a student taking the Math test but pursuing an arts 
oriented degree is likely to be of high ability. The correlation coefficient between Science_Degree and 
Math_Test is 0.27.  
11 We estimated the same regression with an alternative measure of ability which consists of the grade 
obtained in the Math test in Selectividad. We find quantitatively the same results. The sample size using 
the grade measure in Math test is reduced substantially since many subjects did not take this exam.  
12 When we combine all periods and compare pair-wise the treatment effect for each period, we find that 
they are not significantly different. The p-values for periods 2 and 3, periods 2 and 4, and periods 3 and 4 
are 0.9830, 0.7700 and 0.7537, respectively.     15
where our variable of interest is the interaction between girls and the treatment. The 
results are shown in Table 3. We find very strong gender effects. Treated girls do not 
react differently from the non-treated girls, while treated boys do react positively 
compared to the non-treated boys. Notice that from our estimates in column 6, on 
average, a boy in the control group correctly solves 10.03 summations ( ˆ α ), while a 
treated boy solves 15.94 ( ˆˆ α χ + ) summations. However, on average, a girl in the 
control group correctly solves 13.52 ( ˆ ˆ α β + ), while a treated girl correctly solves 13.45 
( ˆˆ ˆˆ α βχδ +++) summations. These results are striking since they imply that all of the 
observed effect on performance is attributed solely to boys. While treated boys increase 
their performance by 59%, treated girls do not change their performance at all. 
  Figure 8 shows the kernel distributions for the correct number of summations for 
boys and girls separately. These figures, again, clearly show that the effect is coming 
from boys reacting to the relative performance feedback information increasing their 
performance while girls do not react at all. 
The strong gender effect in performance, when the relative performance 
feedback information is provided, is consistent with the empirical findings, mostly 
experimental, on both participation in competitions and on performance under 
competitive environments. Women are found to shy away from competition, showing a 
preference for non-competitive environments (Deaner, 2006a and 2006b, Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007, and Niederle and Yestrumskas, 2008), although this is reversed when 
we switch to matrilineal societies (Gneezy et al., 2007). Also, women show to under-
perform in competitive environments compared to men, mostly because men’s 
performance increases when competing against women (Gneezy et al., 2003, Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2004, and Antonovics et al., 2009, Hogarth et al., 2009). However, in a 
natural experiment on schooling, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) found that there is no 
gender differential effect to the provision of relative performance feedback information. 
Further research is needed to address the question of why gender differences might 
depend on the environment.  
 
4.1.3. Feedback Content 
We now consider the importance of the content of the feedback information. 
From period 2 until 4, subjects can react, not only to the provision of information, but 
also to the informational content. In other words, if a subject learns in a period that she   16
is performing above (below) the average, the content might influence her performance 
in the subsequent period.  
We distinguish between positive and negative feedback. From periods 2 to 4, 
positive (negative) feedback would imply that a subject performed above (below) the 
average in the previous period. We also look at the accumulation of feedback 
information. In periods 3 and 4, positive (negative) feedback would be a situation in 
which the subject either performed above (below) the average in the previous two 
periods, or that she has improved (worsened) - i.e., she was initially below (above) the 
average and is now performing above (below). Finally, in period 4, positive (negative) 
feedback would be a situation in which the subject has performed above (below) the 
average in the previous three periods, or that she has improved (worsened).
13 Note that, 
for the treated subjects this information is revealed, i.e. it becomes feedback, while for 
the control subjects it is not. For example, a control subjects who has performed above 
the average will not be informed that she is performing above. For simplicity, we refer 
to being above the average as positive feedback, irrespective of whether or not this 
information has been revealed. 
We estimate the following regression: 
(4)  (1 ) (1 )* it t i i t i i t it Y Positive Treatment Positive Treatment Period α βχ δ λ ε −− =+ + + + + 
where  (1 ) t Positive −  is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the subject performed 
above the average, or improved over time (as explained above), and 0 otherwise. 
it Y measures performance (i.e., submitted and correct number summations, respectively). 
We cluster the standard errors at the subject level. 
Panel A in Table 4 shows the estimates for equation (4) for the different periods. 
In columns 1 and 4, consistent with our previous analysis, all treated subjects 
outperform (both in terms of submitted (column 1) and correct number of summations 
(column 4), respectively) the untreated subjects. In addition, subjects’ performance is 
correlated from period to period, as shown in the coefficient Positive. Interestingly, the 
interaction between the treatment and positive is not significant. This suggests that the 
feedback content is irrelevant for subsequent performances. In other words, what 
matters is the provision of feedback and regardless of whether the subject is given 
positive (negative) feedback, performance will increase. Estimations for the different 
                                                 
13 Improving includes the following two cases: (1) below the average in period 1, above the average in 
periods 2 and 3 and (2) below the average in periods1 and 2, above the average in period 3. The reverse is 
true for worsening.   17
levels of cumulative feedback, columns 2-3 and 5-6, imply similar results. The results 
are however, somehow weaker given the limited number of observations as we 
approach the final period.  
Since we found such a strong gender effect to the treatment, it is interesting to 
understand if boys and girls also react differently to the content of the information. In 
Panel B, we show the estimates for equation (4) for boys only, while in Panel C we 
show the estimates for girls only.   
From Panel B, we see that boys react to the informational treatment, irrespective 
of whether they receive positive or negative feedback. This is consistent with the overall 
result. In Panel C, when we look at girls we find that the treatment, as well as the 
interaction of the content with treatment are not significant. This is consistent with our 
previous finding that girls do not react to either the informational treatment or the 
content of the feedback. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 give the estimates for the cumulative 
information. For boys, the estimates suggest the same findings but they become less 
significant due to fewer observations. Interestingly, for girls, although not significant, 
there are some differential effects depending on the content of the information. When 
girls receive negative feedback, the positive coefficients on the treatment variable, 
suggest that they work harder. However, when girls receive positive feedback the sign 
of the coefficient is negative, suggesting that they relax.  
 
  Overall, we find three important results. First, the provision of relative 
performance feedback information has a positive and significant effect on subjects’ 
performance. In each period the treated subjects outperform the untreated, although the 
effect gets weaker over time. Second, the actual content of the feedback information 
(positive or negative) does not affect subjects’ subsequent performance differently. 
Third, we find a strong gender difference in the reaction to the treatment. The overall 
effect is driven solely by boys. 
 
4.2. Affective Responses: Happiness, Arousal and Dominance. 
4.2.1. The Overall Effect 
Relative performance feedback information potentially has an effect on aspects 
other than performance. In particular, a subject’s affective response may be influenced. 
Organizations care about the affective state of their employees, since it has been found 
that this affects productivity (see for example Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985, Warr,   18
1999, and Oswald et al., 2009) and other relevant issues, such as workers’ morale and 
firms’ retention ability (Bewley, 1999). We measure three aspects of affective response: 
happiness (or subjective well-being), feelings of arousal and dominance.   
We start by looking at the overall treatment effect on these measures. Equations 
(1) and (2) of section 4.1 are estimated, where the dependent variable,  it Y  now refers to 
happiness, arousal and dominance, respectively. The control variables, i X , are the same 
as before. We also include an additional control that measures the number of correct 
summations, Correct.
14 It is reasonable to assume that performance will have a direct 
effect on the affective response (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002). The results for the three 
variables of interest are shown in Table 5. The first column for each panel refers to the 
overall effect, controlling for time fixed effects and by weighting the observations by 
the individual fixed effects (random effects model). The other four columns refer to 
periods 1 to 4, respectively.  
The main result is that treatment is insignificant for all measures of affective 
response, implying that the provision of relative performance feedback information is 
not affecting the subjects’ well-being, arousal and/or feeling of dominance. As 
expected, the number of correct summations has a positive impact on all three affective 
response measures. The better the subjects perform, the happier, the more aroused and 
dominant they feel. The coefficient on Correct is positive and significant for all three 
measures of affective response. As for the other control variables in Table 5b, the only 
noticeable finding is that, as one would expect, subjects find the task less interesting 
over time (arousal level decreases). As with the performance analysis, since the control 
variables do not change the treatment coefficient, the subsequent analysis does not 
include them.  
 
4.2.2. Gender 
In section 4.1.2 we found that the provision of relative performance feedback 
information affected the performance of boys very differently from girls’. In particular, 
we found that the effect on performance was driven solely by the boys’ reaction to the 
treatment. It is therefore, natural to investigate whether there are gender differences in 
the affective response.  
                                                 
14 We also estimated (1) and (2) without the variable Correct and the main results remain the same.    19
We extend the analysis from the previous section, in line with equation (3), to 
look for gender differences in the treatment effect. Table 6 shows the results. The 
treatment is insignificant. Additionally, the interaction coefficient of girl and the 
treatment implies that the provision of relative performance feedback information does 
not affect boys’ affective response differently from girls’.  
 
4.2.3. Feedback Content 
  As with performance, we now turn to study the informational content on the 
subject’s affective response. We will estimate the following equation: 
(5) * it it i it i t it Y Positive Treatment Positive Treatment Period α βχ δ λ ε =+ + + + + 
where  it Y refers to the affective response measures and  it Positive is a dummy variable if 
the subject performed above the average or improved over time (as explained in section 
4.1.3) and 0 otherwise. Note that unlike equation (4), the feedback content in the current 
period will affect the dependent variable in the same period (see timeline of the 
experiment in Figure 1). This information is provided to the treated subjects just before 
eliciting their affective response. As with the performance analysis, we also consider 
how the cumulative feedback affects affective response. 
Table 7 shows the estimation for the differential effects of the content of the 
information on the affective response. In the first panel, columns 1 to 4, we consider the 
effect of the feedback content on happiness. As we saw in the previous estimates, 
people who are performing well, in this case those who are performing above the 
average, reveal themselves to be significantly happier. More importantly, the treatment 
significantly increases the inequality between the happiness of those subjects who are 
receiving positive and negative feedback. We find that a subject who is in the control 
group and performing below the average reports a happiness of 6.26 ( ˆ α ), while a 
control subject performing above the average reports a happiness of 6.66 ( ˆ ˆ α δ + ). 
However, a treated subject who is informed that she has performed below the average 
reports a happiness level of 5.95 ( ˆˆ α χ + ), while a treated subject who is informed that 
she has performed above the average reports an average happiness of 6.85 
( ˆˆ ˆˆ α βχδ +++). This implies that control subjects performing above the average are 7 
percent happier than those performing below the average. For the treated subjects, those 
who are given positive feedback reveal to be 15 percent happier than those who are   20
given negative feedback. Overall, the informational feedback treatment leads to an 
increase in the inequality of subjects’ happiness by 8 percentage points.  
This result is a key finding, as it suggests that when we look at the average effect 
of the treatment on happiness, the effect is canceled out. However, once we control for 
the content of the information, we see that the treatment increases the difference in 
happiness between those who received positive and negative feedback.  
When we look at the cumulative effect of feedback, in columns 2 to 4, we see 
very similar results. The magnitude of the gap between the subjects performing above 
and below the average is increasing over time. In the final period, we find that while for 
the control group the gap in happiness between the above and below performing 
subjects remains stable (from 7 to 10 percent), for the treatment group, the gap increases 
substantially with the cumulative feedback (from 15 to 21 percent). 
Columns 5 to 8 show the results for arousal. Overall, we find no significant 
effect of the interaction between the content and the treatment. What we do see is that 
the subjects performing above the average, irrespective of the treatment, reveal 
themselves to be more aroused than those performing below the average. Also, over 
time, as expected subjects’ arousal goes down. 
Columns 9 to 12 show the results for the feeling of dominance. Overall, we find 
a significant effect of the interaction between the content and the treatment. Providing 
subjects with positive feedback increases the gap in the feeling of dominance between 
those subjects performing above and below the average. We find that a subject who is in 
the control group and performing below the average reports a dominance level of 6.13 
( ˆ α ), while a control subject performing above the average reports a dominance level of 
6.31 ( ˆ ˆ α δ + ). However, a treated subject who is informed that she has performed below 
the average reports a dominance level of 5.94 ( ˆˆ α χ + ), while a treated subject who is 
informed that she has performed above the average reports an average dominance of 
6.45 ( ˆˆ ˆˆ α βχδ +++). This implies that control subjects performing above the average 
feel 3 percent more dominant than those performing below the average. For the treated 
subjects on the other hand, those who are given positive feedback reveal to be 9 percent 
more dominant than those who are given negative feedback. Overall, the feedback 
treatment leads to an increase in the gap of subjects’ dominance by 6 percentage points. 
More importantly, when we look at the cumulative effects, we also find some 
interesting results. From columns 10-12, we see that consistently receiving positive   21
(negative) feedback has a significantly positive (negative) effect on the treated subjects’ 
feeling of dominance. In particular, in period 4, the feedback treatment leads to an 
increase in the gap of subjects’ dominance by 25 percentage points. We find that while 
for the control group the gap in dominance between the above and below performing 
subjects remains stable (from 3 to 4 percent), for the treatment group, the gap increases 
substantially with the cumulative feedback (from 9 to 29 percent). 
 
This section shows that the treatment has very different effects on the affective 
response of those who are receiving positive versus negative feedback. We found that 
receiving positive (negative) feedback affects subjects’ happiness and dominance levels 
positively (negatively), such that when we only consider the overall treatment effect, the 
opposite signs cancel out. This also suggests that the increase in happiness (dominance) 
for those subjects performing above average and the decrease in happiness (dominance) 
for those subjects performing below average is of equal magnitude. Furthermore, the 
treatment increases the inequality in both happiness and dominance levels. Given that 
we elicit subjects’ affective response after the feedback treatment, there is the concern 
that there may be experimental demand effects. We are able to rule out this concern in 
the following section.  
 
5. Analysis under Flat-Rate Incentives 
There are two important concerns that we may have with regard to the analysis 
so far. First, under piece-rate, we cannot disentangle whether the effects we observe are 
a consequence of relative performance or relative payment feedback. Second, with 
respect to the findings on affective response, we may be concerned that the treatment 
effects we found are driven by experimental demand effects. In this section, we address 
both of these issues by replicating our analysis under flat-rate incentives. 
Under piece-rate incentives, given that the agents are rewarded according to 
their absolute performance, the feedback informs them about their relative performance, 
as well as their relative payment (or income). It is important to understand whether the 
individuals are reacting to either the relative performance or the relative payment or to 
both. A good way to separate the two effects is by changing the underlying incentive 
scheme from piece-rate to flat-rate. Since under piece-rate what we observe is the net 
effect, the analysis under flat-rate allows us to disentangle the performance from the   22
income effect. We run experiments using exactly the same procedures and design, 
except for the fact that now all subjects were paid 15 euros, irrespective of their 
performance (flat-rate incentives).
15  
Overall, we find no effect of providing relative performance feedback on any of 
the two measures of performance, as shown in Table 8 and Figure 9. There is, however, 
an interesting gender difference, as observed under piece-rate incentives. As it can be 
seen in Table 9, there is evidence that boys react positively to the treatment, although 
the magnitudes are much smaller than under piece-rate incentives. The overall effects 
are significant for the number of submitted summations but not for the number of 
correctly submitted summations.  
To quantify the gender differences under the different incentive schemes, recall 
that under piece-rate, boys increased their performance by 59%, while now we see from 
Table 9 that under flat-rate incentives, they increased by 19%, showing that although in 
the same direction, the effect is much smaller. Furthermore, we find that the interaction 
between treatment and girl is negative and significant, such that girls react negatively to 
the relative performance information. Recall that under piece-rate, girls did not increase 
their performance, while now we see that under flat-rate incentives, their performance 
was reduced by 16%. Figure 10 shows the kernel distributions for the correct number of 
summations for boys and girls separately. We can, again, clearly see that while treated 
boys increase their performance, treated girls reduce their performance. This explains 
why, when we pool boys and girls together, the overall effect under flat-rate is canceled 
out.  
The observed effects under piece-rate incentives measure the net effect of 
providing both relative income and relative performance feedback, while the observed 
effect under flat-rate incentives measures only the effect of providing relative 
performance feedback. From this comparison we can conclude that, while both boys and 
girls react positively to the relative income information, girls and boys react in opposite 
directions to the purely relative performance information.  
Regarding affective response, shown in Table 10, we find that the relative 
performance feedback information has no effect on the three variables of interest. 
Contrary to what we found under piece-rate incentives, even when we control for the 
feedback content (learning that one is performing above or below the average), we find 
                                                 
15 We had two sessions where we had 18 subjects instead of 20, yielding a total of 156 subjects instead of 
160.    23
that treatment is not significant. This is reassuring as it strengthens the validity of our 
findings under piece-rate, since the results suggests that the effects on both happiness 
and feeling of dominance found under piece-rate incentives are a real response to 
relevant information and not driven by experimental demand effect. We refer to it as 
relevant information because the relative performance feedback information under 
piece-rate has consequences in terms of payment and income, while relative 
performance feedback information under flat-rate incentives does not. These differences 
in the responses help us to also rule out that the effects on affective response found 
under piece-rate incentives were due to purely experimental demand effects.  
We conclude that the provision of relative performance feedback information is 
most effective under piece-rate incentives, as it pushes subjects to work harder and 
increase their production. Moreover, it has important effects for the subjects’ emotional 
state, increasing the inequality in happiness and feeling of dominance between those 
subjects performing above and below the average, only under piece-rate incentives. In 
other words, when this information has consequences in terms of income, subjects react 
by being happier (unhappier) if they are above (below) the average because this 




In this study we have shown that relative performance feedback information is 
an important tool to increase the performance of individuals, independent of the 
feedback content. Given the provision of this information is easy to implement and 
almost cost-free, it is an attractive policy to improve performance. However, we have 
also shown that the relative performance feedback information increases the inequality 
in individuals’ happiness and feeling of dominance. This may imply a trade-off to a 
policy maker who is deciding whether or not to provide relative performance feedback 
information. Although it is agreed that enhancing performance is a positive result, the 
increase in inequality in affective response of individuals might be debatable and 
therefore, its evaluation is subject to the culture of the organization.   
Further analysis suggests that individuals mostly react when relative 
performance information has consequences in terms of income (under piece-rate 
incentives). In practice, we mostly observe that relative performance feedback 
information is linked to relative income information. Even without a formal piece-rate 
scheme, performing above or below the average usually has consequences in terms of   24
income, such as the possibility of promotions/demotions or even the possibility of being 
fired. Thus, we believe that the relevant findings are those seen under piece-rate 
incentives.  
A striking finding of the paper is the large gender difference in the effect on 
performance from the provision of relative performance feedback information. We find 
that, under piece-rate, boys and girls react very differently to the information.  While 
boys react positively, such that there performance increases by 59%, girls do not react at 
all. This will have important policy implications, as it suggests that the effectiveness of 
the policy will largely depend on who is being treated. The findings from the flat-rate 
incentives also add to the interest on the gender difference issue. We find that treated 
boys react, even when there are no income consequences depending on performance, 
but they react much less (19%) than under piece-rate. Girls, on the other hand, react 
negatively when this information is provided under a flat-rate scheme. These gender 
differences can be reconciled. Under piece-rate incentives, relative performance 
feedback information includes both relative income and purely relative performance 
information. From the differences between flat and piece-rate incentives, we can infer 
that while boys react positively to both elements, girls react positively to the relative 
income information but negatively to purely relative performance information. Hence, 
under piece-rate, the effect on boys is larger than under flat-rate and the effect on girls is 
cancelled out. In terms of the affective response, we find that both boys’ and girls’ 
happiness is affected by the relative income information (i.e., under piece-rate but not 
flat-rat), which is consistent with the relative income and happiness literature.   
This paper contributes to the growing interest in the study of the effects of 
providing relative performance feedback information in organizations. We propose a 
comprehensive study of providing relative performance feedback information, including 
performance measures, as well as variables that measure agents’ emotional state. 
Moreover, the results of this paper open new research questions. In particular, long-run 
effects of the provision of relative performance feedback information need to be studied 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Timeline of the Experiment 
 
Figure 2. Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM)  
Panel A: Happiness 
 
             1     2        3          4             5           6             7            8            9 
Note: 1 represents feeling “happy, pleased, satisfied, contented, hopeful, relaxed” and 9 represents feeling 
“unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, melancholic, despairing, or bored”. 
 
Panel B: Arousal 
 
             1     2        3          4             5           6             7             8           9 
Note: 1 represents feeling “stimulated, excited, frenzied, jittery, wide awake, aroused” and 9 represents 
feeling “relaxed, calm, sluggish, dull, sleepy, unaroused”. 
 
Panel C: Dominance 
             
             1     2        3          4             5           6             7           8            9 
Note: 1 represents feeling “controlled, influenced, cared for, awed, submissive” and 9 represents feeling 
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Notes: Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. 
Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. 
Dominance takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least dominant and 9 represents the most dominant.   31
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Notes: Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. 
Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. 
Dominance takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least dominant and 9 represents the most dominant. 
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 Table 1: Treatment Effect on Performance: Number of Submitted Summations 
  ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant 14.8047***  16.2375*** 19.4125*** 22.0875*** 22.9375*** 14.1366*** 16.6414*** 19.2984*** 22.9889*** 18.8939*** 
  [0.6487] [0.6321] [0.6530] [0.6505] [0.6723] [4.9005] [4.9700] [5.1468] [5.1619] [5.3940] 
Treatment  2.0469** 2.6250*** 1.8750**  1.9750**  1.7125*  2.0143** 2.5503***  1.8141*  1.9538**  1.7391* 
  [0.8711] [0.8939] [0.9235] [0.9200] [0.9508] [0.9222] [0.9361] [0.9694] [0.9722] [1.0159] 
Period  2.1456***       2.1276***      
  [0.0815]       [0.0833]      
Girl        0.3718  0.4096  1.054  0.0454  -0.0218 
        [0.9569]  [0.9714]  [1.0059]  [1.0089]  [1.0542] 
Foreign        -0.148  -0.0811  0.0169  0.2709  -0.7988 
        [2.0569]  [2.0880]  [2.1623]  [2.1686]  [2.2661] 
Age        -0.0503  -0.1112  -0.1128  -0.1135  0.1364 
        [0.2180]  [0.2213]  [0.2292]  [0.2299]  [0.2402] 
Science_Degree        0.1751  0.0073  0.4377  -0.1891  0.4444 
        [0.9785]  [0.9932]  [1.0286]  [1.0316]  [1.0780] 
Math_Test        2.0677*  2.3797*  2.2962*  2.1243*  1.4706 
        [1.1971]  [1.2152]  [1.2584]  [1.2621]  [1.3189] 
Observations  640 160 160 160 160 608 152 152 152 152 
Number  of  subject  160       152      
 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The variable Science_Degree takes value 1 if 
the degree of study is Architecture, Biology, Business, Computer Science, Economics, Engineering or Human Resources and 0 if the degree is Communication, Health, 
Human Science, Law, Marketing, Photography, Political Science and Translation and Interpretation. The variable Math_Test takes value 1 if the subject took the Math test in 
the national level university entry exam “Selectividad”.  
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Table 2: Treatment Effect on Performance: Number of Correct Summations 
  ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant 12.3422***  13.3875*** 16.8625*** 19.3750*** 20.1000*** 11.5499** 12.1676**  16.3306*** 21.5645*** 16.3278*** 
  [0.6853] [0.6909] [0.6910] [0.6867] [0.6950] [5.1087] [5.4980] [5.4754] [5.4741] [5.6040] 
Treatment  2.1406** 3.1250*** 1.9500**  1.8625*  1.625  2.1354** 3.1863***  1.8396*  1.8368*  1.679 
  [0.9023] [0.9770] [0.9772] [0.9712] [0.9829] [0.9610] [1.0355] [1.0313] [1.0310] [1.0555] 
Period  2.0356***       2.0191***      
  [0.1000]       [0.1034]      
Girl        0.5525  0.7837  1.237  0.3527  -0.1634 
        [0.9972]  [1.0745]  [1.0701]  [1.0699]  [1.0953] 
Foreign        0.3086  -0.1819  0.9881  0.6244  -0.1962 
        [2.1435]  [2.3098]  [2.3003]  [2.2998]  [2.3543] 
Age        -0.048  -0.0433  -0.102  -0.1801  0.1335 
        [0.2272]  [0.2448]  [0.2438]  [0.2438]  [0.2496] 
Science_Degree        0.236  0.0655  0.4852  0.3875  0.0056 
        [1.0196]  [1.0987]  [1.0942]  [1.0940]  [1.1199] 
Math_Test        1.8632  2.1648  2.2689*  1.5963  1.4226 
        [1.2475]  [1.3443]  [1.3387]  [1.3384]  [1.3702] 
Observations  640 160 160 160 160 608 152 152 152 152 
Number  of  subject  160       152      
 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The variable Science_Degree takes value 1 if 
the degree of study is Architecture, Biology, Business, Computer Science, Economics, Engineering or Human Resources and 0 if the degree is Communication, Health, 
Human Science, Law, Marketing, Photography, Political Science and Translation and Interpretation. The variable Math_Test takes value 1 if the subject took the Math test in 
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Table 3: Gender Differences in the Treatment Effect on Performance 
   Number of Submitted Summations  Number of Correct Summations  
   ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4
Constant 12.8859***14.2593***16.7407***20.4074*** 21.5926*** 10.0313***10.4815***14.0741***17.4444***18.4815***
    [1.0584] [1.0657] [1.0897] [1.1036] [1.1470] [1.0973] [1.1455] [1.1558] [1.1647] [1.1799] 
Treatment 5.3106***  5.9832*** 5.8653*** 5.0168*** 4.3771*** 5.9099*** 7.7306*** 6.0168*** 5.1010*** 4.7912***
    [1.4005] [1.4370] [1.4693] [1.4881] [1.5466] [1.4407] [1.5445] [1.5585] [1.5704] [1.5910] 
Girl 2.8962**  2.9860**  4.0328*** 2.5360*  2.03  3.4881*** 4.3864*** 4.2089*** 2.9140**  2.4430* 
    [1.2760] [1.3093] [1.3388] [1.3559] [1.4092] [1.3127] [1.4073] [1.4200] [1.4309] [1.4496] 
GirlxTreatment -5.1856***  -5.3348*** -6.2772*** -4.8538** -4.2763** -5.9706*** -7.2794*** -6.3850*** -5.1404** -5.0775**
   [1.7694] [1.8155] [1.8563] [1.8800] [1.9540] [1.8202] [1.9514] [1.9690] [1.9840] [2.0100] 
Period 2.1456***       2.0356***     
    [0.0815]       [0.1000]      
Observations  640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 
No. of subject  160       160      
 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  Table 4: Feedback Content on the Treatment Effect on Performance 
PANEL A  Submitted  Correct 
   PERIODS 2-4  PERIODS 3-4 PERIOD 4 PERIODS 2-4 PERIODS 3-4  PERIOD 4
Constant  12.5459***  16.6226*** 19.1220*** 10.2386***  14.0976*** 16.1220***
    [0.7131]  [1.3285] [0.7139] [0.7381]  [1.5413] [0.7268] 
Treatment 1.7487**  1.7596**  1.4422  1.5774**  1.5832*  1.1601 
    [0.6737]  [0.7159] [1.0224] [0.7166]  [0.8089] [1.0409] 
Positive  7.2548***  7.4654*** 8.1508*** 7.5776***  7.8124*** 8.2114***
    [0.7835]  [0.8320] [1.0690] [0.8110]  [0.8682] [1.0883] 
PositivexTreatment  0.656  0.364 0.2062  0.9437  0.5296 0.796 
    [1.2872]  [1.3272] [1.4927] [1.2989]  [1.3527] [1.5197] 
Period 1.7384***  0.6163*    1.5523*** 0.4954    
   [0.1717]  [0.3524]    [0.1907] [0.4075]    
Observations  480  320 151 480  320 151 
PANEL B  Submitted (BOYS)  Correct (BOYS) 
   PERIODS 2-4  PERIODS 3-4 PERIOD 4 PERIODS 2-4 PERIODS 3-4  PERIOD 4
Constant  11.5644***  18.0263*** 19.0000*** 9.1398***  15.1243*** 16.1111***
    [1.1121]  [2.0654] [1.1172] [1.1628]  [2.6368] [1.0997] 
Treatment 2.5860**  2.4603**  1.4615  2.4212**  2.2524*  1.5043 
    [0.9996]  [1.0350] [1.7252] [1.2002]  [1.3442] [1.6982] 
Positive  7.5287***  8.3232*** 7.5714*** 7.5147***  7.8620*** 6.4603***
    [1.2600]  [1.2584] [2.1113] [1.4220]  [1.4290] [2.0783] 
PositivexTreatment  1.4859  0.5812 1.8618 2.1908  1.6142 3.1348 
    [2.1771]  [2.1664] [2.7145] [2.2320]  [2.2435] [2.6720] 
Period 1.8664***  0.101    1.7049***  0.1039     
    [0.3043] [0.5903]    [0.3219] [0.7058]     
Observations  180  120 57 180  120 57 
PANEL C  Submitted (GIRLS)  Correct (GIRLS) 
   PERIODS 2-4  PERIODS 3-4 PERIOD 4 PERIODS 2-4 PERIODS 3-4  PERIOD 4
Constant  13.3570***  16.0972*** 19.2174*** 11.1313***  13.7413*** 16.1304***
    [0.9358]  [1.7649] [0.9427] [0.9248]  [1.8771] [0.9750] 
Treatment  1.0783  1.2366 1.398 0.8889  1.0957  0.9849 
    [0.9020]  [0.9744] [1.2941] [0.8729]  [0.9973] [1.3385] 
Positive  6.8018***  7.0221*** 8.2441*** 7.1864***  7.6146*** 8.6773***
    [0.9707]  [1.0417] [1.2941] [0.9505]  [1.0277] [1.3385] 
PositivexTreatment 0.0705  -0.154  -0.9122  0.2366  -0.3023 -0.4242 
    [1.4590]  [1.5356] [1.8806] [1.5064]  [1.5973] [1.9450] 
Period 1.6467***  0.8607*    1.4466***  0.6784     
    [0.2096] [0.4420]    [0.2392] [0.4978]     
Observations  300  200 94 300  200 94 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. The variable Positive becomes positive feedback for the treated subjects 
while this information is never revealed to the control subjects.  We cluster the standard errors at the 
individual level. Table 5a: Treatment Effect on Affective Response: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance 
   HAPPINESS AROUSAL  DOMINANCE 
   ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4  ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4  ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4 
Constant  4.9975*** 5.0869*** 5.0800*** 4.4660*** 4.8887*** 4.2881*** 3.8347*** 4.0353***  3.2930***  3.4930*** 5.3919*** 5.5858*** 5.6999*** 5.0916*** 5.0224*** 
    [0.2224] [0.3012] [0.3838] [0.4260] [0.4322] [0.2636] [0.3506] [0.4117]  [0.5115]  [0.5616] [0.2159] [0.3404] [0.3659] [0.4238] [0.4319] 
Treatment -0.281  -0.2228  -0.3287  -0.4309*  -0.1396  0.0653  -0.0024 -0.065  0.0097  0.3132 -0.1609 -0.02 -0.2266  -0.2645  -0.0739 
    [0.2021] [0.2392] [0.2517] [0.2480] [0.2457] [0.2416] [0.2784] [0.2700]  [0.2978]  [0.3193] [0.2236] [0.2704] [0.2399] [0.2467] [0.2455] 
Period  -0.0354              -0.2623***              -0.031             
   [0.0428]              [0.0502]              [0.0350]             
Correct  0.1006*** 0.0953*** 0.0916*** 0.1172*** 0.1013*** 0.0702*** 0.0768*** 0.0654***  0.0888***  0.0457* 0.0576*** 0.0384*  0.0393** 0.0682***  0.0685*** 
    [0.0119] [0.0189] [0.0202] [0.0201] [0.0197] [0.0141] [0.0220] [0.0217]  [0.0241]  [0.0256] [0.0106] [0.0213] [0.0193] [0.0200] [0.0197] 
Observations  640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160  160  160 640 160 160 160 160 
No. of subject  160              160              160             
 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 
represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. Dominance takes 
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Table 5b: Treatment Effect on Affective Response: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance  
   HAPPINESS AROUSAL  DOMINANCE 
   ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4  ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4  ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4 
Constant 4.7837***  4.1427***  4.9326***  4.9001*** 4.7682***  0.6965  -1.1634  0.9229  0.2215  0.1027  5.6337*** 5.3264*** 5.9627*** 5.5936*** 5.4434*** 
    [1.1384] [1.3068] [1.4329] [1.4432] [1.4057] [1.3399] [1.4918] [1.5294] [1.7073] [1.8276] [1.2389] [1.4872] [1.3576] [1.4094] [1.3837] 
Treatment  -0.255  -0.166  -0.2866 -0.3513 -0.2186  0.0803  -0.09 -0.0174  0.0365 0.3764  -0.2322  -0.0334 -0.3184 -0.3329 -0.1947 
    [0.2137] [0.2499] [0.2648] [0.2612] [0.2596] [0.2515] [0.2852] [0.2827] [0.3090] [0.3375] [0.2329] [0.2843] [0.2509] [0.2550] [0.2555] 
Period  -0.0206              -0.2673***              -0.0283             
   [0.0438]              [0.0516]              [0.0360]             
Girl  0.2751  0.6550**  0.1563 0.2948 0.0058 0.1486 0.1225 0.3333  -0.0757  0.2  -0.1371 0.0927 -0.1635 -0.1913 -0.2523 
    [0.2202] [0.2517] [0.2731] [0.2682] [0.2670] [0.2591] [0.2873] [0.2915] [0.3173] [0.3472] [0.2406] [0.2864] [0.2587] [0.2619] [0.2629] 
Foreign -0.0235  -0.3512  0.0939  -0.025 0.1885 0.2727 0.5536 0.5355 0.0028  -0.0122 0.172  0.0215 -0.0197 0.3785 0.3176 
    [0.4730] [0.5400] [0.5847] [0.5764] [0.5740] [0.5568] [0.6164] [0.6241] [0.6819] [0.7463] [0.5169] [0.6145] [0.5540] [0.5629] [0.5650] 
Age  -0.0012 0.0328 -0.0088 -0.0271 -0.0005 0.1483**  0.2138***  0.1160* 0.1331* 0.1374* -0.0147 0.002 -0.0118  -0.0302 -0.021 
    [0.0501] [0.0572] [0.0620] [0.0612] [0.0609] [0.0590] [0.0653] [0.0661] [0.0724] [0.0792] [0.0548] [0.0651] [0.0587] [0.0598] [0.0599] 
Science 0.1987  0.2961  0.3891  -0.0654  0.174 -0.0501  0.3504  -0.2006  -0.361 0.005 -0.0393 -0.1936  0.103  -0.1795  0.1182 
    [0.2250] [0.2569] [0.2781] [0.2742] [0.2730] [0.2649] [0.2932] [0.2969] [0.3244] [0.3550] [0.2459] [0.2923] [0.2635] [0.2678] [0.2688] 
Math_Test -0.0141  -0.3297  0.1362  0.0417 0.0972  0.6605** 0.467  0.7800**  0.7419*  0.6472 0.2389  0.294  0.1055  0.409  0.1915 
    [0.2762] [0.3171] [0.3434] [0.3370] [0.3353] [0.3251] [0.3619] [0.3665] [0.3987] [0.4359] [0.3015] [0.3608] [0.3254] [0.3291] [0.3300] 
Correct  0.0985*** 0.0937*** 0.0885*** 0.1139*** 0.1031*** 0.0653*** 0.0759*** 0.0614*** 0.0839***  0.0385 0.0583***  0.0405* 0.0405** 0.0693***  0.0704*** 
    [0.0122] [0.0194] [0.0211] [0.0208] [0.0202] [0.0144] [0.0222] [0.0225] [0.0246] [0.0263] [0.0109] [0.0221] [0.0200] [0.0203] [0.0199] 
Obs.  608 152 152 152 152 608 152 152 152 152 608 152 152 152 152 
No. of subject  152              152              152             
 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 
represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. Dominance takes 
values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least dominant and 9 represents the most dominant. The variable Science_Degree takes value 1 if the degree of study is Architecture, 
Biology, Business, Computer Science, Economics, Engineering or Human Resources and 0 if the degree is Communication, Health, Human Science, Law, Marketing, 
Photography, Political Science and Translation and Interpretation. The variable Math_Test takes value 1 if the subject took the Math test in the national level university entry 
exam “Selectividad”. 
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Table 6: Gender Differences on the Treatment Effect on Affective Response: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance  
   HAPPINESS AROUSAL  DOMINANCE 
   ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4  ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4  ALL  PERIOD 1  PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  PERIOD 4 
Constant  4.8937*** 4.8301*** 5.0566*** 4.2652*** 4.9812*** 4.1817*** 3.8935*** 3.8628*** 3.1942*** 3.3278*** 5.4350*** 5.5046*** 5.7919*** 5.1789*** 5.1576*** 
    [0.2874] [0.3456] [0.4252] [0.4673] [0.4782] [0.3424] [0.4092] [0.4537] [0.5617] [0.6212] [0.3002] [0.3977] [0.4040] [0.4649] [0.4734] 
Treatment -0.2658  -0.4237  -0.2731  -0.206  -0.155  0.1103  -0.2444 -0.1386 0.3573  0.4574 -0.0135 0.0701 -0.1103 -0.0951  0.271 
    [0.3381] [0.4050] [0.4297] [0.4169] [0.4136] [0.4044] [0.4795] [0.4585] [0.5012] [0.5372] [0.3717] [0.4660] [0.4083] [0.4148] [0.4093] 
Girl 0.1607  0.3432  0.0584  0.3888  -0.1369  0.1685 -0.1708 0.2693  0.276  0.2906 -0.0531 0.1578 -0.1179 -0.0733 -0.0548 
    [0.3041] [0.3531] [0.3845] [0.3725] [0.3696] [0.3638] [0.4180] [0.4102] [0.4478] [0.4801] [0.3358] [0.4062] [0.3653] [0.3706] [0.3659] 
GirlxTreatment -0.0045  0.374  -0.0841  -0.3238  0.0089  -0.0535  0.3685 0.161 -0.5427  -0.2046  -0.2552  -0.1239 -0.2104 -0.2913 -0.5803 
   [0.4237] [0.4957] [0.5359] [0.5206] [0.5182] [0.5069] [0.5868] [0.5717] [0.6259] [0.6732] [0.4672] [0.5703] [0.5091] [0.5180] [0.5129] 
Period  -0.035              -0.2614***              -0.0297             
   [0.0430]              [0.0505]              [0.0352]             
Correct  0.1004*** 0.0975*** 0.0907*** 0.1143*** 0.1012*** 0.0698*** 0.0808*** 0.0650*** 0.0844***  0.0444* 0.0570***  0.0367  0.0385* 0.0662***  0.0636*** 
    [0.0121] [0.0195] [0.0211] [0.0206] [0.0202] [0.0143] [0.0231] [0.0225] [0.0247] [0.0263] [0.0107] [0.0224] [0.0200] [0.0205] [0.0200] 
Observations  640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 
No. of subject  160              160              160             
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 
represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. Dominance takes 
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Table 7: Feedback Content on the Treatment Effect on Affective Response: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance 
   HAPPINESS AROUSAL  DOMINANCE 












3-4 PERIOD  4 
Constant 6.2565***  6.1616***  5.6948***  6.4800*** 5.1359*** 5.3832*** 6.3054***  4.4800*** 6.1323*** 6.1673*** 6.2326***  6.2400*** 
    [0.1798]  [0.2653]  [0.4335] [0.3200]  [0.2099] [0.2983]  [0.5031] [0.4020]  [0.1789] [0.2194]  [0.3276] [0.3024] 
Treatment  -0.2831  -0.5393* -0.6411** -0.3689  0.1136  0.2949  0.191  -0.2207 -0.1941  -0.3627  -0.6021**  -0.8326** 
   [0.2323]  [0.2932]  [0.3269]  [0.4441]  [0.2726]  [0.3394] [0.3958]  [0.5578]  [0.2411]  [0.2680] [0.2966]  [0.4197] 
Positive  0.4070**  0.1812 0.4696*  0.6473*  0.3823**  0.5942***  0.4033 -0.0982  0.1756 0.1475  0.0709 0.2327 
   [0.1629]  [0.2062]  [0.2501]  [0.3860]  [0.1869]  [0.2274] [0.2948]  [0.4848]  [0.1304]  [0.1520] [0.1962]  [0.3647] 
PositivexTreatment 0.4704** 0.7154**  0.8946**  0.619  0.2293 -0.0808  0.1605 0.9144  0.3334*  0.4712**  0.8861***  1.3221** 
   [0.2262]  [0.3033]  [0.3661]  [0.5405]  [0.2596]  [0.3368] [0.4341]  [0.6788]  [0.1815]  [0.2288] [0.2943]  [0.5108] 
Period 0.0805**  0.1595***  0.2375**     
-
0.1888*** -0.3100***  -0.5300***    0.0392  0.0416  0.0364    
   [0.0407]  [0.0580]  [0.1092]     [0.0465]  [0.0625]  [0.1249]     [0.0315]  [0.0398]  [0.0763]    
Observations  640  480  320 160  640 480  320 160  640 480  320 160 
Number of subject  160  160  160     160  160  160     160  160  160    
 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 
represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. Dominance takes 
values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least dominant and 9 represents the most dominant. The variable Positive becomes positive feedback for the treated subjects while this 
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Table 8: Treatment Effect on Performance under Flat-rate Incentives 
   Submitted  Correct 
   ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant  14.7115*** 16.4231*** 19.2949*** 21.4487*** 22.6667*** 12.7372*** 14.1538*** 17.0128*** 19.3718*** 20.0641*** 
   [0.7095] [0.6393] [0.7263] [0.7333] [0.7464] [0.7395] [0.6714] [0.7541] [0.7791] [0.7661] 
Treatment  -0.0577 -0.5897  0.6538  0.0128  -0.3077 -0.3333 -0.5513  0.4615  -0.8333 -0.4103 
   [0.9556] [0.9042] [1.0271] [1.0370] [1.0555] [0.9888] [0.9495] [1.0664] [1.1018] [1.0835] 
Period  2.0987***       1.9654***      
   [0.0865]       [0.0963]      
Observations  624 156 156 156 156 624 156 156 156 156 
No. of subject  156       156      
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Table 9: Gender Differences in the Treatment Effect on Performance under Flat-Rate Incentives 
   Number of Submitted Summations  Number of Correct Summations 
   ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL  PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant 14.5865***  16.4848*** 19.2727*** 20.8485*** 22.7273*** 12.5259*** 14.4242*** 16.9394*** 18.5152*** 19.8788*** 
    [1.0358] [0.9696] [1.0910] [1.0899] [1.1251] [1.0799] [1.0222] [1.1378] [1.1671] [1.1557] 
Treatment  2.6263* 1.2893  3.3402**  3.6676**  2.2082  2.3348  0.9951 3.0929*  2.8719* 2.3793 
    [1.4555] [1.3932] [1.5676] [1.5660] [1.6166] [1.5126] [1.4687] [1.6348] [1.6769] [1.6605] 
Girl  0.2167 -0.1071 0.0384 1.0404 -0.1051 0.3662 -0.4687 0.1273 1.4848 0.3212 
   [1.3336] [1.2766] [1.4364] [1.4349] [1.4813] [1.3860] [1.3457] [1.4980] [1.5365] [1.5215] 
GirlxTreatment -4.4636** -3.1139* -4.4598**  -6.1097*** -4.1709** -4.4435**  -2.5464  -4.3723**  -6.2124*** -4.6431** 
   [1.8951] [1.8140] [2.0411] [2.0389] [2.1049] [1.9695] [1.9123] [2.1286] [2.1834] [2.1621] 
Period  2.0987***       1.9654***      
    [0.0865]       [0.0963]      
Observations 624 156 156 156 156 624 156 156 156 156 
No.  of  subject  156       156      















   45
Table 10: Feedback Content on the Treatment Effect on Affective Response: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance 
   HAPPINESS AROUSAL  DOMINANCE 












3-4 PERIOD  4 
Constant 6.5739***  6.7501***  6.6286***  6.3714*** 4.8265*** 5.0830*** 5.2399***  4.4571*** 6.3863*** 6.5273*** 5.9565***  6.2857*** 
    [0.1950]  [0.2575]  [0.4193] [0.3005]  [0.2131] [0.2597]  [0.4171] [0.2942]  [0.1867] [0.2214]  [0.3251] [0.2631] 
Treatment  -0.3173 -0.3173  -0.339 -0.0381  -0.2208 -0.1612  -0.091 -0.0762  -0.2984  -0.5739**  -0.5731**  -0.4524 
   [0.2862]  [0.2862]  [0.3237]  [0.4068]  [0.2798]  [0.2988] [0.3320]  [0.3983]  [0.2539]  [0.2666] [0.2855]  [0.3562] 
Positive  0.7021*** -0.304  -0.0933 0.6983* 0.1778  0.1265  0.2956  0.5196  0.3164**  -0.4067** -0.1897  0.1794 
   [0.1672]  [0.2151]  [0.2597]  [0.4047]  [0.1875]  [0.2109] [0.2605]  [0.3962]  [0.1300]  [0.1688] [0.2052]  [0.3543] 
PositivexTreatment -0.1065  0.3916  0.1708  -0.0317 -0.0746 -0.2804  -0.4235 -0.4839  0.0272  0.5504** 0.3752  0.5984 
   [0.2300]  [0.2981]  [0.3685]  [0.5716]  [0.2579]  [0.2916] [0.3697]  [0.5596]  [0.1786]  [0.2328] [0.2914]  [0.5005] 
Period -0.0985***  0.0407  0.0619    -0.0441  -0.1024**  -0.1690*    -0.0615** 0.0203  0.1570**   
    [0.0374]  [0.0544]  [0.1012]   [0.0423]  [0.0516]  [0.0993]   [0.0282]  [0.0397]  [0.0735]  
Observations  624  468  312 156  624 468  312 156  624 468  312 156 
No. of subject  156  156  156    156  156  156    156  156  156   
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.    46
Appendix 
Instructions and the questionnaire were identical for the control and treated groups 
except for the parts shown in bold, which appeared only in the treatment group.  
A. Instructions: 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR EXPERIMENT! 
 
This is an experiment and thus, no talking, looking-around or walking is allowed. If you have 
any question or need help please raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist you. If 
you do not comply with the rules, WE WILL ASK YOU TO LEAVE THE EXPERIMENT 
AND YOU WILL NOT RECIEVE ANY PAYMENT. Thank you. 
 
This experiment is about individual decisions. Pompeu Fabra University has provided funds to 
carry it out. You will receive 3euros for having arrived on time. Additionally, if you follow the 
instructions correctly you may earn more money. 
 
These instructions will inform you about the type of decisions you will be taking, as well as 
how your decisions will affect your payment. Everything you earn will be for you and paid in 
cash inside a closed envelope in a strictly private way at the end of the experimental session. 
 
Each participant has been given a "Experiment Code" to guarantee that no participant can 
identify another one by his/her decisions nor earnings. Researchers will observe each 
participant’s earnings at the end of the experiment but we will not associate your decisions with 
any participants’ names.  
 
Your Experiment Code is:  
 
This experiment consists of four periods. Your final payment will be the sum of a participation 
fee of 3euros plus whatever you earn in the four periods of the experiment. 
 
Each period lasts 5 minutes. During this type you will be shown summations of four numbers of 










The right solution is 136. 
  
The summations will appear one by one and you will have to submit an answer in the indicated 
box. Using a calculator or paper and pencil for doing the summations is totally prohibited. If 
you do not comply with this rule, we will ask you to leave the experiment and you will not 
receive any payment. When you have solved a summation, you can submit the solution and 
click on “OK”. The numbers in the summations, as well as the order in which they appear, will 
be exactly the same for all participants. In each period, you can solve as many summations as 
you can for the duration of 5 minutes of the period.  
 
You will be paid for each correct solution, exactly 0.15 euros (15 cents) for each correct 
solution.  
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Thus, if you solve 1 summation correctly in the four periods, you will earn a total of 3.15euros 
(3 euros as a show-up fee plus 0.15euros for the correct solution).  
 
Thus, if you solve 25 summations correctly in the four periods, you will earn a total of 
6.75euros (3 euros as a show-up fee plus 25*0.15=3.75euros for the correct solutions).  
 
Thus, if you solve 110 summations correctly in the four periods, you will earn a total of 
19.5euros (3 euros as a show-up fee plus 110*0.15=16. 5euros for the correct solutions).  
 
Notice that the numbers in the examples are used for illustrative purposes. They DO NOT 
intend to suggest how many summations anyone should solve correctly.  
 
Between the periods you can rest for two minutes. During this time you will be informed about 
the number of correctly solved summations during that period, as well as about the average 
number of correctly solved summations in the experimental session. Also, we will ask you 
to answer a brief questionnaire of three questions.  
 
At the end of the 4 periods you will be shown your total earnings for this experiment, as well as 
the average earnings in this experimental session and we will ask you to fill in a 
questionnaire, as well as the information for the receipt. Wait for your Experiment Code to be 
called for you to come to the experimenter’s room in order to receive the envelope with your 
earnings.  
 




A. Please, fill in the following information: 
Gender 
First Language 
Field of Study 





1. ¿Did you participate in similar experiments? If your answer is positive, please explain. 
 
2. I am satisfied with the experience of having participated in this experiment. 
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
3. I am satisfied with the payment that I obtained in this experiment. 
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
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4. I would consider participating again in this experiment. 
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
5. I value positively the information I obtained at the end of each period with respect to the 
number of summations I solved correctly.  
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
6. I value positively the information I obtained at the end of each period with respect to 
the average number of correct summations solved in this experimental session.  
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 




8. What grade did you obtain in your Math exam during Selectividad? 
 
 